|Battle of Chiari|
|Date:||1 September 1701|
|Bourbon side:||Alliance side:|
|Victor Amadeus||Prince Eugen|
|Villeroy||Prince de Commercy|
|Catinat||Thomas de Vaudemont|
|Prince of Vaudemont|
1 The Habsburg army threatens Milan
The French strategy for Italy in July 1701 had been to keep the Habsburg army north of the Po and east of the Mincio, a river that runs from Lake Garda to Mantua. In late july the French Army then failed to effectively block or dispute the passage of this river, and so the Imperialists crossed into the lands of Brescia. The Bourbon command retreated to the Oglio and the Habsburg army threatened to march into the Duchy of Milan.
This gave Versailles reason to intervene. If the Habsburg army got any significant foothold in Milan, the rulers of Modena, Parma and Mantua/Monferrato might change sides, and even the Venetians might join the Habsburgs. Therefore extra troops were send to the front and Louis XIV sent Villeroy to Italy with the express command to give battle.
2 The opposing armies
2.1 The Habsburg army
In 1701 a rather small Habsburg army had marched into Italy under Prince Eugen of Savoy. The infantry consisted of 8 regiments: Alt Starhemberg (later in 1701 Kriechbaum); Mansfeldt (later Gehlen); Nigrelli; Starhemberg; Herberstein; Guttenstein; Bagni and Daun. Judging by the number of 19,200 infantry men these were probably rather complete and counted 4 battalions each. The cavalry consisted of 6 regiments and there were 4 dragoon regiments. On 27 July this army consisted of 29 battalions, 84 squadrons and 70 field guns. At the time of the battle of Chiari Prince Eugen was waiting for the Gschwindt and Lothringen regiments to arrive.
2.2 The Bourbon army
In the beginning of the campaign the mostly French field army of the Bourbon side in Italy had been of about the same size as the Imperial army. On 25 July the Duke of Savoy arrived at the army with 11 battalions and 5 squadrons and took over the command. With that the army was brought to a strength of 52 battalions and 77 squadrons. On 22 August 1701 Villeroi arrived in camp and at that moment his field army consisted of 75 battalions and 78 squadrons.
It's interesting to take a more detailed look at this army as represented in the French Order of Battle of 22 August0. On the extreme right of the infantry we find the Spanish regiments in the position of honor. These were the Tercios Lombardie and Napoli and the regiments Artiaga and De Gy. The Spanish Lisboa was probably detached. In the center was the Savoyard element: Gardes de S.A.R. (2 Btns.); Monferrato; Saluzzo; Aosta, and in the second line: Chablais; Fusiliers; Piedmonte; Savoie and Schulembourg. Of the Savoyans one guard battalion and the white cross regiment were probably detached.
3 The commands
3.1 Eugen's command
Prince Eugen was the undisputed commander of the Imperial army. His second in command was Charles de Lorraine Prince de Commercy. As General of cavalry Eugen had Prince Thomas de Vaudémont, son of the Prince de Vaudemont who was governor of Milan on the Bourbon side. In general one can note that the command of the Habsburg army got along very well.
3.2 The Bourbon command
The command of the Bourbon army was officially held by Victor Amadeus as generalissimo. This was caused by the fact that he was a sovereign and a very important ally to Louis XIV. He had only arrived on 25 July and before that, and in his absence, the Prince de Vaudémont, governor of Milan, was the official commander. Victor Amadeus and De Vaudemont were however only contributing few troops to the army, and so for practical purposes France of course wanted one of its marshals to command.
At the very start of the war Tessé had been sent to manage French interests in Italy. When a serious army had to be sent to Italy there were however only a few options, and from these Catinat was chosen. Catinat led the French forces for a while, but on 22 August Villeroy arrived to supercede him. On 1 September there were thus three generals on the French side who had some claim to command.
Thus the command in Italy was made a snake-pit. Lieutenant-general Count Tessé and the Prince de Vaudemont (governor of Milan) were fond of intriguing. They did not neglect anything to place Catinat in a dark light at Versailles. Victor Amadeus was suspected of treason, but no definite proof was produced. Tessé did however intrigue against him too.
3.3 The contribution of Victor Amadeus
With regard to the Bourbon command it's tempting to consider Victor Amadeus as just another royal figure-head for an army that was led by professional soldiers. This was however not the case. First of all Victor Amadeus was himself just as much a professional soldier as the rest of the senior officers were. Next to that he was a sovereign ruler and a very adept and ruthless politician. To me it seems very unlikely that any senior officer could truely command in his presence.
With regard to the conduct of Victor Amadeus one can wonder whether he was really betraying the Bourbon plans to the empire. So far I do not know about any direct evidence of this, but that may not be relevant at all. What is relevant is the difference in his behavior in 1701 and the behavior he displayed in 1705 and 1706. In these latter years he displayed how extremely well he could lead an army. In 1701 'his' army was however marked by an apathy and incompetence which cannot be aligned with his skills as a commander.
I do not doubt at all that with his intelligence, skills and prestige as sovereign Victor Amadeus was quite capable of dominating all of the generals in his army. The fact is however that Victor Amadeus chose not to do this. He acted like Catinat was really in command and probably fostered all the dissensions in the Bourbon command. Such a behavior can then be aligned with his natural interest, which was to end the Bourbon encirclement of his Duchy. Victor Amadeus no doubt worked to this end. Whether he tried to reach this goal by actual betrayal or by insinuation and political intrigues is not that relevant. He did contribute his part to the disaster that followed.
4 The French march north east
4.1 French offensive plans
The French field army was about twice as strong as the imperial army. Considering this it was no wonder that Villeroy had been sent to Italy with an express order to attack. He arrived at the French camp near Antegnate in the evening of 22 August with his commission and orders. Vaudemont and Catinat meanwhile received letters about Villeroy's appointment. There is a statement that Villeroy held a letter of dismissal for Catinat, but chose not to use it1.
On 23 August the French command held a Council of War and decided to cross the Oglio somewhat below Castle Pumenengo. Villeroy immediately informed the king by a letter of 24 August2. In it he stated that the imperial army was posted from Palazzolo in the north to Urago d'Oglio in the south, and occupied Pontoglio. Villeroy knew that in Palazzolo with its stone bridge the enemy had only cavalry. He furthermore noticed that the Imperialists did not want to defend the river and got their supplies from Lake Garda by a supply line that was covered by their post at Castiglione. In the morning of the 24th Victor Amadeus, Villeroy, Catinat and Vaudemont then had a discussion about whether they should make a detachment to Goito in order to threaten the Imperial supply lines, but with a view to Louis' orders to attack this option was dropped.
Villeroy furthermore stated that the French army was posted with the right wing at Fontanella, the center at Antegnate and the left at Covo. Mr. de Colmenero would command a detachement to Lake Como with the Soissonnais and Thieroche regiments, the Albert dragoons and some Spanish cavalry. Some other Spanish cavalry were to be left on the Adda in order to be rid of them. The only Spanish cavalry that would participate in the march was that of the Duke d'Elceste with six squadrons. With this the army that marched was to have a strength of 56 French battalions, 8-9 Savoyan battalions, 4 Spanish battalions, 88-90 squadrons and 44 guns. That very morning Villeroy had reviewed the army and therefore was able to give some details about the strength of the units: Of the units that had been in Italy some time the squadrons counted about 80-90 men each and the battalions 360-400 men, except for the Irish, which were more numerous. The 25 battalions and 20 squadrons that had recently arrived were considerably stronger. The Savoy troops were deemed to be very good and to set an example fot the whole army.
Villeroy also noted that his army was disadvantaged by the fact that the whole population was against it and the locals were firing at its soldiers. About the geography he noted that the landscape was even more 'cut' than Flanders, meaning that there were a lot of canals and smaller waters. This meant that the cavalry could not do that much, but given the fact that Villeroy was superior in infantry he should have appreciated this as an advantage.
Eugen was quite well informed of what was going on in the French camp. He wrote a letter to the emperor on 25 August3. In it he noted that the French army had been reviewed on the 24th and was still near Fontanella.
4.2 The French cross the Oglio
Villeroy kept Louis posted about his movements in a letter he started to write on 27 August and continued on the 28th4. In it he announced that he would start to cross the Oglio, but would halt it when half his army had crossed in order to check whether the enemy would not suddenly cross it too. Half an hour before midnight of the 27-28 August the army started to march in four columns. Somewhat earlier at 6 PM a detachment of 10 squadrons and 4 battalions under Pracontal had been sent to Palazzolo and Pontoglio in order to make a feint. Eugen made a feint too, because Villeroy believed he had reasons to believe that he was making preparations to retreat.
On 29 August the French had passed the Oglio and camped at Rudiano and Villeroy sent his next letter5. In it he conveyed his belief that the Imperialists would retreat towards Brescia. On 30 August he started his next letter6. In it he used the word Seriola and remarked that it had steep boards and was quite deep. He also remarked that he had heard that on the day of the crossing De Commercy and the young Prince de Vaudemont (son of the De Vaudemont in the French army) were in Rudiano with a hundred horse and that the Imperial army came to know of the crossing by a Courier sent by them.
On the 30th the French command perceived that the Imperialists were still in their camp, but unanimously thought that they would retreat towards Brescia in order to save their supply lines. It then decided to march to Castrezato in order to constrain the enemy. On the march to that place it received a message that the enemy had marched to Rovato. This message could not be verified, but the command decided to push the right wing of the army to Berniana. In the evening the command heard that the enemy was still in place between Chiari and Urago. At noon on the 31st Villeroy continued his letter and stated that the army was building bridges across the Trenzana. He also remarked that he would make use of his superiority in infantry and would cross the Trenzana that day.
At 7 PM on the 31st Villeroy wrote another letter7. The bread convoy had only arrived at 6 PM and because of the time needed for the distribution it was thought more convenient to use the 31st for this distribution and to pass the Trenzana on 1 September.
4.3 Eugen's reaction to the French offensive
We can deduce Eugen's reaction to the French offensive by a letter he wrote on the 31st, and because of it being written before the battle we have little doubt that it fairly reflects the events preceeding it8. On the 28th he was already aware that the French had sent away their supply train and was clearing the way to the Oglio. On the 29th Eugen then did not want to try to prevent the crossing of the Oglio because the water level was very low. (Villeroy had even marked that the water did not come above the knees of the soldiers.) In stead Eugen just took his forces back across the Trenzana and destroyed all bridges in sight, so the enemy would have to make a large detour to get at him. He then swung his left wing eastward to a position centered on Chiari. He furthermore ordered General Palffy back from Palazzolo and sent couriers to the Gschwindt and Lothringen regiments so that they would hasten their march.
What is remarkable is that after Eugen had finished his letter and was in the process of dispatching his courier he got a 'reliable message' that the enemy would not march that day. One could of course try to connect this with good reconnaisance on Eugen's part, but that is not convincing. In stead of simply stating this fact about the enemy not marching in his post scriptum Eugen then adds about 10 paragraphs to his letter. He states that strengthened by its reinforcements the enemy would now try to drive him into a corner or to encircle him. This Eugen could have guessed, but he suddenly also makes an exact statement that these reinforcements counted 25 battalions and 20 squadrons, and that the French right wing was moving to the mountains. From this it becomes clear that Eugen had a source of information close to the French command.
Except for being riddled with canals the plane of the Po had another obvious characteristic, it lacked heights from which one could observe the enemy. Therefore reconnaisane parties could not be replaced with observing the landscape from a height. It might be useful to scrape some things together about how the reconnaisance of both parties fared.
In a letter of 22 August Eugen wrote that in 3 days his parties had killed about 70 men without losing anybody themselves. Just like it had gone with almost all parties to date. Also that during the whole campaign only 2 cavalrymen had been lost as prisoners, and then only because they had to lag behind for replacing their horseshoes. On 25 August he mentioned that Lieutenant-Colonel Mercy had brought in a lieutenant, 18 prisoners and horses. Dragoon colonel Count Roccavion had brought in about 18 and horses. Marquis Vaubonne brought in a complete convoi and took brigadier Narbonne; 7 officers and a few dozen others prisoner. Of the escort he had killed 18 infantry and nobody had escaped. On 31 August Eugen mentioned that in the past two days about 50 deserters had come in.
Indeed the whole campaign in Italy was characterized by the Imperialists having the upper hand in party warfare. They always seemed to know what the French were doing and were only rarely surprised by French parties stronger than them. This might have had to do with expertise, treason or espionage. Another reason could be that the population perceived the French army as a direct threat to their possessions, and was willing to lend the Imperialists a helping hand. In enemy territory one could then order or force any civilian in the countryside to stay indoors. The area of confrontation was however mostly neutral, so it was probably very difficult to take measures against the population aiding the enemy.
4.5 Eugen digs in around Chiari
The Venetian town of Chiari had a medieval city wall, but no modern fortifications. The landscape around this town was however characterised by a lot of irrigation channels. On 31 August 1701 Eugen had arrived before Chiari and summoned the small Venetian garrison to surrender the place. His pretense was that it was not a fortified place and that the Venitians therefore could not refuse him entrance. The Venetians made some protests, but then gave way when Eugen agreed to give them a written testimony of their protests.
For Eugen's disposition we have a letter by him to the emperor written three days after the battle9. The following is a loose translation of fragments of this letter.
'I then ordered Von Guttenstein to occupy Chiari with two battalions of his regiment and some guns. Then to draw a line from there to the rivulet (Red: la Seriola Nuova) and to raise a small parapet half of it covered by a small existing canal and half of it without it (from this we can deduce that Eugen here writes about the line north of Chiari). I also let some foot soldiers occupy some mills and houses before and on the left hand of Chiari. I posted all the rest of the infantry in two lines at the camp on the right side of Chiari, but behind a similar parapet. I posted the cavalry behind the left and the right of Chiari, but from them some regiments along the two canals in case the enemy would attack from those directions.'
Later Eugen made some nearer dispositions: 'After I occupied Chiari I ordered 30 men under a lieuteant to occupy a mill in a suburb on the right hand. On the left hand I also ordered the same number of men into a large 'Cassine'. I ordered the third battalion of Guttenstein to be posted a bit more backwards in the alleys before the ditch of Chiari in order to sustain these two posts. A mill about 600 passes further away (or up north?) was occupied by the fourth Guttenstein battalion, which was entrenched and supported by 1,000 cavalry and the Dietrichstein dragoons. On the right hand of Chiari I posted 200 men from the Herberstein and Kriechbaum regiments in 4 cassinen which lay in a row where the line ran upto the water (of the Trenzana).'
Later in this letter it becomes clear that behind the advanced posts on the left the (other) battalions of Nigrelli, Herberstein and Krichbaum were posted behind the northern parapet. This then leaves about 20 battalions posted in two lines south of Chiari. The question is whether these lines were posted paralel to the Trenzana or had their front behind the southern parapet. This boils down to considering whether two ten battalion wide lines fit behind this parapet. The distance between Chiari and the Trenzana was about 1200 meters. The battalions probably had a strength of about 500 men in three rows. The width of a battalion thus was 160 men and with each men taking 50 cm a battalion would be about a 100 meters wide. This means that ten battalions fit into this space and we can assume that the Imperial main force was indeed making front to the east south of Chiari.
5 The Battle of Chiari
5.1 An attack by detachement
For the final French movements to the battlefield of Chiari we have a thorough account by Villeroy himself10. After crossing the Seriola Trenzana and the Roggia Castrina the French command was notified that there was a post of Imperial troops on their left hand. Villeroy, Catinat and Victor Amadeus all went to take a look and saw that Imperial troops held 'a church' just before Chiari11. The French command decided to attack this post. Villeroy later states that from multiple sources he knew that the enemy main force had retreated miles from Chiari and the command decided to attack because conquering this post would give it a good impression of the location of the Imperial army. Whether this was truely the intention or the attack was a simple blunder merits some investigation.
|Battalions in the line of battle at Chiari|
|Brigades on the left|||||Brigades on the right|
|Anjou||Anjou||Royal Comtois||Royal Comtois||Bresse|||||Normandie||Normandie||Normandie||Bourgogne||Bourgogne|
|Roy. Vaisseaux||Roy. Vaisseaux||Roy. Vaisseaux||Perigord||Cambrésis|||||Auvergne||Auvergne||Médoc||Dillon||Galmoy|
What we do know is that for this attack the first four brigades on the left of the two line were designated. What is remarkable is that on a normal approach the Normandie and Auvergne would have been in the first line, but now the Anjou brigade came in the first line to march next to the Normandie brigade. This was caused by the fact that up till then the French army was busy bypassing the Habsburg army. In order to move west two roads were used, and so the move probably started in two columns one headed by a battalion of the Normandie, the other by a battalion of the Anjou. In order to attack in the constrained area between the two canals the four brigades then executed a classical deployment in two lines with the second battalion of a brigade deploying on the right hand of the first battalion etc.
This maneuver can only be qualified as making an attack with a detachment. This even though the size of this detachment was limited only by the available space between the two canals. The rest of the Bourbon army stayed in its position to the east; facing north, and expecting to resume the march in that direction. If the Bourbon command had counted on the possibility that the whole Habsburg army was at Chiari, it would have sent strong reconnaisance parties to probe the position, and then made a maneuver with the whole army. The attack with a detachment led by the supreme commanders is only consistent with an absolute conviction that the enemy had only part of his troops at Chiari.
We can then make further deductions on how the Bourbon command estimated the enemy's strength. Because the detachment counted 20 battalions against an entrenched position, we can assume that it did not count on more than about 5 battalions being present. If no more than about two battalions were suspected present however, the whole sense of a time-consuming action of sending a 20 battalion detachment becomes doubtful.
In light of the evidence and the contemporary logic of operations, it's therefore safe to assume that the Bourbon command assumed that there were somewhere between 2-5 enemy battalions posted at and north of Chiari, but that with regard to the main part of the enemy army it only assumed that it had retreated. Irrespective of what happened later the attack can therefore be considered to have been a blunder. As long as there was no certainty about where the enemy main force was, any attack on an entrenched position might bleed to death if the enemy was able to bring up reinforcements. In such a case the four brigades might still have been brought forward, but there should have been strong reconnaisance parties north and south of it to ascertain that they were really treating with an isolated post.
So, to return to Villeroy's statement that he made the attack to get a good impression of the location of the Imperial army; it's nonsense. Villeroy had no idea where the enemy army was, and was convinced that at Chiari he was only facing a few isolated battalions. Afterwards the battle of Chiari would universally be compared to that of Walcourt.
5.2 Actual fighting
With regard to the actual fighting we know that Villeroy led the right wing composed of the Normandie and Auvergne brigades. Victor Amadeus and Catinat commanded the left column with the Anjou and Vaisseaux12. The attack begun at about 14:30 PM.
On the right the Normandie brigade with the Normandie and Bourgogne regiments bypassed the outposts on the Seriola Nuova and went straight for the parapet13. From the Auvergne brigade the regiments Médoc, Dillon and Galmoi attacked the mill that was defended by the fourth battalion of the Guttenstein14. This attack was repulsed with heavy losses and Eugen later mentioned that an Irish flag was conquered by a rifleman from this Guttenstein battalion.
The Normandie and Bourgogne regiments (5 battalions) that continued to the main Imperial position fared even worse. Here the defending regiments of Nigrelli and Kriechbaum (perhaps 4 battalions) waited till the very last moment before firing at them from a very short distance. This fire from a covered position by an enemy that was almost equal in numbers, and especially the shrapnell shot fired by the artillery quickly decimated these French regiments and forced them to retreat.
On the left Victor Amadeus regiments started an attack on the outlying cassines and conquered them after a long resistance. A subsequent counter attack by the third Guttenstein battalion together with the grenadiers of Nigrelli, Herberstein and Graf Daun against the right- and a Mansfeldt battalion with its grenadier company against the left of these French did however push them back out of these cassines.
What's remarkable is that all sources agree that both Victor Amadeus and Catinat exposed themselves heavily to the enemy fire. Most sources agree that Victor Amadeus did this to prove his loyalty. Others speculate that he did this to ruin the brigades he commanded, but to me this seems too far flung.
On closer examination it seems that the attack by the Normandie brigade (commanded by Villeroy) was indeed the only point where the battle turned to slaughter. If we extrapolate the 560 losses of the Normandie regiment (see below) to 840 killed and wounded for that whole brigade, it had a loss ratio of about 35% killed or wounded. That leaves about 1200 lost for the other 15 battalions, or 1200/7500 = 15%.
5.3 The battle ends
After heavy fighting the attack with 4 brigades had thus been repulsed at about 18:30PM. Furthermore about one third of the soldiers involved had been killed or wounded and the enemy position stood as solid as before. The French then thought about bringing forward fresh troops to continue the battle, but perceived that they were in fact facing the whole imperial army. Villeroy later stated this as the reason to order the retreat and to end the battle. The facts are of course a bit different. The French were still twice as strong as the imperialists, but had manouvered themselves in a constrained area where they could not use their numerical advantage to overcome the enemy's entrenchments.
What's remarkable is that during the fight Eugen had not moved any troops to the sector that was under attack. It might be possible that he could not see where the rest of the French were, or that he simply believed his position strong enough to withstand the 4 brigades.
6 The Results
Eugen conservatively estimated the French losses at more than 2,000 killed and wounded. Amongst these were 200 officers, about 100 of them taken prisoner. The Imperial losses he gave as 36 killed and 81 wounded. Dangeau gave the loss as 1,500 killed and wounded. Amongst which Brigadier Chassagna killed; Colonels of foot le Comte d'Esterre and Monsieur de Dreux (reg. Bourgogne) wounded; the reformed colonels Marquis de Chastellux (reg. Normandie) and De Bonde, as well as two Irish colonels killed.
For some more detail we can delve into regimental loss numbers to get a clearer picture. The Normandie regiment had 63 officers and 500 soldiers killed or wounded. Amongst the killed 5 captains. Its colonel Comte d'Esterre was wounded by a bullet in his arm. Medoc lost several officers, amongst them captain d'Argelos. Apart from that I've not found anything yet.
The French losses were serious, but did not have any effect on the balance of power in Italy. The French army remained roughly twice as strong as the imperial. What was serious was that the French had lost an opportunity to push the empire back. Furthermore, the confidence of the ordinary soldiers and officers in their commanders had been lost.
7 Blame and credit
Eugen did not take much action during the battle, but should be credited with 2 things. Unlike the French command he grasped the characteristics of the landscape. The Oglio was the large river on maps of the area, but due to irrigation the Seriola's were indeed deeper, and therefore of more strategic significance. While the French were discussing the crossing of the Oglio, that could be waded through, Eugen chose his position behind the Seriola Trenzana, which had to be bridged and was a formidable obstacle. Furthermore Eugen was very active in sending out reconnaisance parties and other small detachments that greatly diminished the effectiveness of the French reconnaisance.
On the Bourbon side some generals officers and soldiers might be credited with personal courage. With regard to generalship there were however only mistakes. First of all the lack of reconnaisance. The French attacked without knowing that they were attacking the whole Imperial army. They also did not grasp the strength of the Imperial entrenchment, but this was logical because it could not be reconnoitered before the outposts were conquered. Both these reconnaisance 'mistakes' were probably excusable on any other terrain, simply because the French army was about twice as strong. The terrain on which the French attacked was however constrained by two rivers, and so the excuse of numerical advantage did not count. In such a case an attack was like attacking up a narrow flight of stairs, and that should only be done when one knows exactly how many men are up there. Villeroy should be blamed for lacking this basic strategical insight.
Even then, by itself the attack did not have to turn into such a disaster. When the troops of the right wing reached the main Imperial position and suffered massive shrapnell fire Villeroy could have had the presence of mind to order a retreat. For the left wing of Victor Amadeus and Catinat it was a bit different, they had a ferocious struggle for a few strongpoints. In the end they conquered them, but were kicked out soon after. The heavy losses on this wing probably only occured during this enemy counter attack. In order to assess where they should have stopped their attacks we would need to know the losses on their wing.
|0) Pelet vol. 1 page 602 has this OOB|
|1) Pelet vol. 1 page 301 has a note with a statement that Villeroy and Victor Amadeus were in concert about the fact that Catinat no longer commanded, but that Villeroy did not hand Catinat this letter of dismissal and that it pleased Victor Amadeus to let both command officially by giving them the command word on alternate days.|
|2) Letter by Villeroy to Louis XIV 24 August 1701 published in Pelet vol. 1 page 301.|
|3) Eugen an den Kaiser 25 August 1701, published in Miltärische Korrespondenz des Prinzen Eugen von Savoyen by F. Heller vol. 1 Wien 1848. Page 189.|
|4) Letter by Villeroy to Louis XIV 27 August 1701 published in Pelet vol. 1 page 308.|
|5) Letter by Villeroy to Louis XIV 29 August 1701 published in Pelet vol. 1 page 310.|
|6) Letter by Villeroy to Louis XIV 29 August 1701 published in Pelet vol. 1 page 311.|
|7) Letter by Villeroy to Louis XIV 29 August 1701 published in Pelet vol. 1 page 314.|
|8) Eugen an den Kaiser 31 August 1701, published in Miltärische Korrespondenz des Prinzen Eugen von Savoyen by F. Heller vol. 1 Wien 1848. Page 195.|
|9) Eugen an den Kaiser 4 September 1701, published in Miltärische Korrespondenz des Prinzen Eugen von Savoyen by F. Heller vol. 1 Wien 1848. Page 201.|
|10) Letters by Villeroy to Louis XIV 1701 published in Pelet vol. 1 page 315.|
|11) Ditto: 'Nous vimes qu'effectivement les ennemis teanaient une grande église sur notre gauche, tout contre Chiari'.|
|12) Villeroy to Louis XIV 2 September 1701: Les brigades de Normandie et d'Auvergne étaient a l'attaque de la droite; celles d'Anjou et des Vaisseaux a la gauche.. . son altesse royale voulut demeurer a l'attaque de la gauche et me chargea de celle de la droite.|
|13) Villeroy to Louis XIV 2 September 1701: Les trois bataillons de Normandie et les deux de Bourgogne allerent droit s'attacher aux retranchements des ennemis.|
|14) Villeroy to Louis XIV 2 September 1701: Les Irlandais et Médoc, qui attaquaient sur la droite, firent tout ce que'on peut attendre des plus brave troupes.|